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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 646 647 648 649 650 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 680 681 682 683 684 685 686 687 688 689 690 691 692 693 694 695 696 697 698 699 700 701 702 703 704 705 706 707 708 709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 742 743 744 745 746 747 748 749 750 751 752 753 754 755 756 757 758 759 760 761 762 763 764 765 766 767 768 769 770 771 772 773 774 775 776 777 778 779 780 781 782 783 784 785 786 787 788 789 790 791 792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 800 801 802 803 804 805 806 807 808 809 810 811 812 813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863 864 865 866 | /* * Copyright (c) 2021 Apple Computer, Inc. All rights reserved. * * @APPLE_LICENSE_HEADER_START@ * * The contents of this file constitute Original Code as defined in and * are subject to the Apple Public Source License Version 1.1 (the * "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the * License. Please obtain a copy of the License at * http://www.apple.com/publicsource and read it before using this file. * * This Original Code and all software distributed under the License are * distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AND APPLE HEREBY DISCLAIMS ALL SUCH WARRANTIES, * INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR NON-INFRINGEMENT. Please see the * License for the specific language governing rights and limitations * under the License. * * @APPLE_LICENSE_HEADER_END@ */ #ifndef _VM_PMAP_CS_H_ #define _VM_PMAP_CS_H_ #ifdef KERNEL_PRIVATE /* * All of PMAP_CS definitions are private and should remain accessible only within XNU * and Apple internal kernel extensions. */ #include <mach/kern_return.h> #include <mach/vm_param.h> #include <mach/vm_types.h> #include <mach/boolean.h> #include <img4/firmware.h> #include <img4/nonce.h> __BEGIN_DECLS /** * Check if the PPL based code signing is enabled on the system or not. With a bit of * a refactor on how this function is defined, we could soon move this within the * XNU_KERNEL_PRIVATE directive. */ bool pmap_cs_enabled(void); /** * Allocate the entitlements acceleration buffer when we're already under the PPL * context. This function is called by CEEnvironmentAllocate when we attempt to accelerate * entitlements from within the PPL. */ uint8_t* pmap_ce_allocate_acceleration_buffer( size_t size); /** * Free the entitlements acceleration buffer when we're already under the PPL context. * This function is called by CEEnvironmentFree when we attempt to decelerate the * entitlements context from within the PPL. */ void pmap_ce_free_acceleration_buffer( uint8_t *data, size_t size); #if XNU_KERNEL_PRIVATE /* * Any declarations for types or functions which don't need to be exported to kernel * extensions should go here. Naturally, this means this section can also include * headers which may not be available to kernel extensions. */ #if defined(__arm64__) #include <pexpert/arm64/board_config.h> #endif #include <vm/pmap.h> #include <kern/lock_rw.h> #include <libkern/image4/dlxk.h> #include <TrustCache/API.h> #if PMAP_CS #define PMAP_CS_INCLUDE_CODE_SIGNING 1 #endif #if CONFIG_SPTM #define PMAP_CS_PPL_MONITOR 0 #elif XNU_MONITOR #define PMAP_CS_PPL_MONITOR 1 #else #define PMAP_CS_PPL_MONITOR 0 #endif #if PMAP_CS_PPL_MONITOR /* * XNU_MONITOR and PMAP_CS are both defined for the same targets in board_config.h. * As a result, whenever XNU_MONITOR is defined, so is PMAP_CS. In an ideal world, we * can remove the use of PMAP_CS macro and simply use XNU_MONITOR, but that would * require a lot of changes throughout the codebase. * * PMAP_CS_PPL_MONITOR is defined when we have XNU_MONITOR _and_ we explicitly don't * have CONFIG_SPTM. This effectively means that whenever we have PMAP_CS_PPL_MONITOR, * we should also always have PMAP_CS_INCLUDE_CODE_SIGNING. Lets enforce this with a * build check. */ #if !PMAP_CS_INCLUDE_CODE_SIGNING #error "PMAP_CS_INCLUDE_CODE_SIGNING not defined when under PMAP_CS_PPL_MONITOR" #endif /* Immutable part of the trust cache runtime */ extern TrustCacheRuntime_t ppl_trust_cache_rt; /* Mutable part of the trust cache runtime */ extern TrustCacheMutableRuntime_t ppl_trust_cache_mut_rt; /* Lock for the trust cache runtime */ extern lck_rw_new_t ppl_trust_cache_rt_lock; typedef struct _pmap_img4_payload { /* The trust cache data structure which wraps the payload */ TrustCache_t trust_cache; /* The actual image4 trust cache payload */ uint8_t img4_payload[0]; } pmap_img4_payload_t; /* State for whether developer mode has been set or not */ extern uint8_t ppl_developer_mode_set; /* State of developer mode on the system */ extern bool ppl_developer_mode_storage; /* * State of lockdown mode on the system. This variable is an exclusive view of * lockdown mode state for the PPL, and we capture this because the kernel's * view of lockdown mode isn't immutable. */ extern bool ppl_lockdown_mode_enabled; extern bool ppl_lockdown_mode_enforce_jit; /** * Check the PPL trust cache runtime if a particular trust cache has already been * loaded based on its UUID. The PPL trust cache runtime is kept locked as shared * during the function. */ kern_return_t pmap_check_trust_cache_runtime_for_uuid( const uint8_t check_uuid[kUUIDSize]); /** * Load an image4 trust cache of a particular type into the PPL. If validation succeeds, * the payload will remain locked, but the other artifacts will be unlocked. If validation * fails, all artifacts will be unlocked. * * All the lengths passed in will first be rounded up to page-size, so it is expected that * the caller allocates page-aligned data. * * Upon successful validation, the trust cache is added to the runtime maintained by the * PPL. */ kern_return_t pmap_load_trust_cache_with_type( TCType_t type, const vm_address_t pmap_img4_payload, const vm_size_t pmap_img4_payload_len, const vm_address_t img4_manifest, const vm_size_t img4_manifest_len, const vm_address_t img4_aux_manifest, const vm_size_t img4_aux_manifest_len); /* * Query a trust cache from within the PPL. This function can only be called when within * the PPL and does not pin the query_token passed in. */ kern_return_t pmap_query_trust_cache_safe( TCQueryType_t query_type, const uint8_t cdhash[kTCEntryHashSize], TrustCacheQueryToken_t *query_token); /** * Query a trust cache of a particular type from the PPL. The query_token passed in will * be pinned by the PPL runtime when the PPL is attempting to write to it. This is an API * which can be used for callers external to the PPL. */ kern_return_t pmap_query_trust_cache( TCQueryType_t query_type, const uint8_t cdhash[kTCEntryHashSize], TrustCacheQueryToken_t *query_token); /** * Toggle the state of developer mode on the system. This function can only be called with * a true value once in the lifecycle of a boot. * * Until this function is called once to set the state, the PPL will block non-platform * code and JIT on the system. */ void pmap_toggle_developer_mode( bool state); #endif /* PMAP_CS_PPL_MONITOR */ #if PMAP_CS_INCLUDE_CODE_SIGNING #include <kern/cs_blobs.h> #include <libkern/tree.h> #include <libkern/amfi/amfi.h> #include <libkern/crypto/sha1.h> #include <libkern/crypto/sha2.h> #include <libkern/coretrust/coretrust.h> /* Validation data for a provisioning profile */ typedef struct _pmap_cs_profile { /* * The PPL uses the physical aperture mapping to write to this structure. But * we need to save a pointer to the original mapping for when we are going to * unregister this profile from the PPL. */ void *original_payload; /* A CoreEntitlements context for querying the profile */ CEContext_t profile_ctx_storage; const CEContext_t *profile_ctx; /* * Critical information regarding the profile. If a profile has not been verified, * it cannot be associated with a code signature. Development profiles are only * allowed under certain circumstances. */ bool profile_validated; bool development_profile; /* * Reference count for the number of code signatures which are currently using * this provisioning profile for their constraint validation. */ uint32_t reference_count; /* * The list of entitlements which are provisioned by this provisioning profile. * If this list allows the debuggee entitlements, then this profile is considered * a development profile. */ CEContext_t entitlements_ctx_storage; const CEContext_t *entitlements_ctx; /* Red-black tree linkage */ RB_ENTRY(_pmap_cs_profile) link; } pmap_cs_profile_t; /* This is how we expect the kernel to hand us provisioning profiles */ typedef struct _pmap_profile_payload { /* Storage for the provisioning profile */ pmap_cs_profile_t profile_obj_storage; /* Size of the signed profile blob */ vm_size_t profile_blob_size; /* The signed profile blob itself */ uint8_t profile_blob[0]; } pmap_profile_payload_t; /* Trust levels are ordered, i.e. higher is more trust */ typedef enum { PMAP_CS_UNTRUSTED = 0, /* * Trust level given to code directory entries which have been retired and are * no longer valid to be used for any purpose. These code directores are freed * when their reference count touches 0. */ PMAP_CS_RETIRED, /* * This trust level signifies that an application has been verified through the * profile based certificate chain, but the profile in question itself has not * been verified. Code directories with this trust aren't allowed to be run * or mapped. */ PMAP_CS_PROFILE_PREFLIGHT, /* * Signatures provided through the compilation service. These signatures are meant * to only apply to loadable libraries, and therefore have the lowest acceptable trust. */ PMAP_CS_COMPILATION_SERVICE, /* * Signature for out-of-process JIT. These can only be loaded by an entitled process * and have a special library validation policy for being mapped within other processes. * These represent a safer version of JIT. */ PMAP_CS_OOP_JIT, /* * These signatures are those which are trusted because they have been signed by the * device local signing key. */ PMAP_CS_LOCAL_SIGNING, /* * These signatures belong to applications which are profile validated, and for those * whose profiles have also been verified. */ PMAP_CS_PROFILE_VALIDATED, /* * These signatures are those belonging to the app store. */ PMAP_CS_APP_STORE, #if PMAP_CS_INCLUDE_INTERNAL_CODE /* * Engineering roots which are still Apple signed. These don't need to be platform * because they are backed by a CMS signature and therefore would've never been * platform anyways. */ PMAP_CS_ENGINEERING_SIGNED_WITH_CMS, #endif /* * These signatures represent platform binaries which have the highest trust level. */ PMAP_CS_IN_MOBILE_ASSET_TRUST_CACHE, PMAP_CS_IN_LOADED_TRUST_CACHE, PMAP_CS_IN_STATIC_TRUST_CACHE, #if PMAP_CS_INCLUDE_INTERNAL_CODE /* * Engineering roots installed by engineers for development. These are given the * highest trust level. */ PMAP_CS_ENGINEERING_SIGNED, #endif } pmap_cs_trust_t; /* Everything with greater or equal trust is a platform binary */ #define PMAP_CS_LOWEST_PLATFORM_BINARY_TRUST PMAP_CS_IN_MOBILE_ASSET_TRUST_CACHE /* Minimum trust level of a code signature to be run/mapped */ #define PMAP_CS_LOWEST_ACCEPTABLE_TRUST PMAP_CS_COMPILATION_SERVICE typedef struct pmap_cs_code_directory { union { struct { /* red-black tree linkage */ RB_ENTRY(pmap_cs_code_directory) link; /* * Blobs which are small enough are allocated and managed by the PPL. This field * is NULL for large blobs. */ struct pmap_cs_blob *managed_blob; bool managed; /* * The superblob of the code signature. The length we store here is the length of the * memory allocated by the kernel itself, which may be greater than the actual length * of the code signature. */ CS_SuperBlob *superblob; vm_size_t superblob_size; bool superblob_validated; /* * Code directories can be arbitrarily large, and hashing them can take a long time. We * usually hash code directories in a continuable way, yielding our execution context * after hashing some amount of the bytes. */ union { SHA384_CTX sha384_ctx; SHA256_CTX sha256_ctx; SHA1_CTX sha1_ctx; }; uint32_t cd_length_hashed; /* * The best code directory is just an offset away from the superblob. This code directory * is extensively validated for all of its fields. */ const CS_CodeDirectory *cd; bool cd_offset_matched; /* * The first code directory is used when validating the CMS blob attached to a code signature * and is often not the best code directory. */ bool first_cd_initialized; bool first_cd_hashed; uint8_t first_cdhash[CS_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; const uint8_t *first_cd; size_t first_cd_length; const uint8_t *cms_blob; size_t cms_blob_length; CoreTrustDigestType ct_digest_type; /* * Frequently accessed information from the code directory kept here as a cache. */ const char *identifier; const char *teamid; bool main_binary; /* * The DER entitlements blob and CoreEntitlements context for querying this code * signature for entitlements. */ CEContext_t core_entitlements_ctx; CEContext_t *ce_ctx; const CS_GenericBlob *der_entitlements; uint32_t der_entitlements_size; /* * This is parhaps the most important field in this structure. It signifies what * level of confidence we have in this code directory and this trust level * defines execution/mapping policies for this code directory. */ pmap_cs_trust_t trust; /* * Reference count of how many regions this code directory is associated with through * pmap_cs_associate. */ uint32_t reference_count; /* * We maintain this field as it allows us to quickly index into a bucket of supported * hash types, and choose the correct hashing algorithm for this code directory. */ unsigned int hash_type; /* Lock on this code directory */ lck_rw_new_t rwlock; /* * The PPL may transform the code directory (e.g. for multilevel hashing), * which changes its cdhash. We retain the cdhash of the original, canonical * code directory here. */ uint8_t cdhash[CS_CDHASH_LEN]; /* * For performing provisioning profile validation in the PPL, we store the profile as * PPL owned data so it cannot be changed during the validation time period. * * This interface for profile validation is deprecated. */ struct { /* The provisioning profile and its size */ const uint8_t *profile; vm_size_t profile_size; /* Size of memory allocated to hold the profile */ vm_size_t allocation_size; } profile_data; /* * The provisioning profile object used for validating constrainst for profile validates * signatures. This is the newer interface the PPL uses. */ pmap_cs_profile_t *profile_obj; /* * The leaf certificate for CMS blobs as returned to us by CoreTrust. This is used when * verifying a signature against a provisioning profile. */ const uint8_t *cms_leaf; vm_size_t cms_leaf_size; /* * A pointer to the entitlements structure maintained by the kernel. We don't really * care about this other than maintaing a link to it in memory which isn't writable * by the kernel. */ const void *kernel_entitlements; /* * The UBC layer may request the PPL to unlock the unneeded part of the code signature. * We hold this boolean to track whether we have unlocked those unneeded bits already or * not. */ bool unneeded_code_signature_unlocked; }; /* Free list linkage */ struct pmap_cs_code_directory *pmap_cs_code_directory_next; }; } pmap_cs_code_directory_t; typedef struct pmap_cs_lookup_results { /* Start of the code region */ vm_map_address_t region_addr; /* Size of the code region */ vm_map_size_t region_size; /* Code signature backing the code region */ struct pmap_cs_code_directory *region_sig; } pmap_cs_lookup_results_t; typedef struct _pmap_cs_ce_acceleration_buffer { /* Magic to identify this structure */ uint16_t magic; /* * The acceleration buffer can come from one of two places. First, it can come * from the extra space present within the locked down code signature as not * all of it is used all the time. In this case, we don't need to free the * buffer once we're done using it. Second, it can come from the bucket allocator * within the PPL, in which case we need to deallocate this after we're done with * it. */ union { uint16_t unused0; bool allocated; }; /* The length of the acceleration buffer */ uint32_t length; /* The embedded buffer bytes */ uint8_t buffer[0]; } __attribute__((packed)) pmap_cs_ce_acceleration_buffer_t; /* Ensure we have a known overhead here */ _Static_assert(sizeof(pmap_cs_ce_acceleration_buffer_t) == 8, "sizeof(pmap_cs_ce_acceleration_buffer_t) != 8"); #define PMAP_CS_ACCELERATION_BUFFER_MAGIC (0x1337u) #define PMAP_CS_ASSOCIATE_JIT ((void *) -1) #define PMAP_CS_ASSOCIATE_COW ((void *) -2) #define PMAP_CS_LOCAL_SIGNING_KEY_SIZE 97 /* Maximum blob sized managed by the PPL on its own */ extern const size_t pmap_cs_blob_limit; /** * Initialize the red-black tree and the locks for managing provisioning profiles within * the PPL. * * This function doesn't trap into the PPL but writes to PPL protected data. Hence, this * function needs to be called before the PPL is locked down, asn otherwise it will cause * a system panic. */ void pmap_initialize_provisioning_profiles(void); /** * Register a provisioning profile with the PPL. The payload address and size are both * expected to be page aligned. The PPL will attempt to lockdown the address range before * the profile validation. * * After validation, the profile will be added to an internal red-black tree, allowing * the PPL to safely enumerate all registered profiles. */ kern_return_t pmap_register_provisioning_profile( const vm_address_t payload_addr, const vm_size_t payload_size); /** * Unregister a provisioning profile from the PPL. The payload which was registered is * unlocked, and the caller is free to do whatever they want with it. Unregistration is * only successful when there are no reference counts on the profile object. */ kern_return_t pmap_unregister_provisioning_profile( pmap_cs_profile_t *profile_obj); /** * Associate a PPL profile object with a PPL code signature object. A code signature * object can only have a single profile associated with it, and a successful association * increments the reference count on the profile object. */ kern_return_t pmap_associate_provisioning_profile( pmap_cs_code_directory_t *cd_entry, pmap_cs_profile_t *profile_obj); /** * Disassociate a PPL profile object from a PPL code signature object. Disassociation * through this code path is only successful when the code signature object has been * verified. * * This decrements the reference count on the profile object, potentially allowing it * to be unregistered if the reference count hits zero. */ kern_return_t pmap_disassociate_provisioning_profile( pmap_cs_code_directory_t *cd_entry); /** * Store the compilation service CDHash within the PPL storage so that it may not be * modified by an attacker. The CDHash being stored must represent a library and this * is enforced during signature validation when a signature is trusted because it * matched the compilation service CDHash. */ void pmap_set_compilation_service_cdhash(const uint8_t cdhash[CS_CDHASH_LEN]); /** * Match a specified CDHash against the stored compilation service CDHash. The CDHash * is protected with a lock, and that lock is held when the matching takes place in * order to ensure we don't compare against a CDHash which is in the process of changing. */ bool pmap_match_compilation_service_cdhash(const uint8_t cdhash[CS_CDHASH_LEN]); /** * Store the local signing public key in secured storage within the PPL. The PPL only * allows setting a key once, and subsequent attempts to do this will panic the system. * * This key is used during CoreTrust validation of signatures during code signature * verification. */ void pmap_set_local_signing_public_key( const uint8_t public_key[PMAP_CS_LOCAL_SIGNING_KEY_SIZE]); /** * Acquire the local signing public key which was previusly stored within the PPL. If * there is no key stored in the PPL, then this function shall return NULL. */ uint8_t* pmap_get_local_signing_public_key(void); /** * All locally signed main binaries need to be authorixed explicitly before they are * allowed to run. As part of this, this API allows an application to register a CDHash * for the main binary it is intending to run. * * Use of this API requires the appropriate entitlement. */ void pmap_unrestrict_local_signing( const uint8_t cdhash[CS_CDHASH_LEN]); /** * Register a code signature blob with the PPL. If the blob size is small enough, the * PPL will copy the entire blob into its own allocated memory. On the other hand, if * the blob is large, the PPL will attempt to lockdown the passed in blob, and doing * so will require that the address and size provided are page aligned. * * After validation, the signature will be added to an internal red-black tree, allowing * the PPL to safely enumerate all registered code signatures. */ kern_return_t pmap_cs_register_code_signature_blob( vm_address_t blob_addr, vm_size_t blob_size, vm_offset_t code_directory_offset, pmap_cs_code_directory_t **cd_entry); /** * Unregister a code signature blob from the PPL. The signature address is either freed * in case it was owned by the PPL, or it is unlocked in case it was XNU-owned by was PPL * locked. * * If the memory is unlocked, then the kernel is free to do with the memory as it pleases. * Note that this function may not deallocate the cd_entry itself, in case the cd_entry * has any reference counts on it. In that case, the cd_entry is retired, and finally * freed when the final code region which references the cd_entry is freed. */ kern_return_t pmap_cs_unregister_code_signature_blob( pmap_cs_code_directory_t *cd_entry); /** * Verify a signature within the PPL. Once a signature has been verified, it gets assigned * a trust level, and based on that trust level, the cd_entry is then allowed to be * associated with address spaces. */ kern_return_t pmap_cs_verify_code_signature_blob( pmap_cs_code_directory_t *cd_entry); /** * Once we've verified a code signature, not all blobs from the signature are required * going forward. This function can be used to unlock parts of the code signature which * can then be freed by the kernel to conserve memory. */ kern_return_t pmap_cs_unlock_unneeded_code_signature( pmap_cs_code_directory_t *cd_entry, vm_address_t *unneeded_addr, vm_size_t *unneeded_size); /** * Create an association of a cd_entry within a code region in the pmap. If the cd_entry * is a main binary, then it is set as the main region of the pmap, otherwise the cd_entry * is evaluated for a library validation policy against the main binary of the pmap. */ kern_return_t pmap_cs_associate( pmap_t pmap, pmap_cs_code_directory_t *cd_entry, vm_map_address_t vaddr, vm_map_size_t vsize, vm_object_offset_t offset); /** * Iterate through the code regions present in the SPLAY tree for checking if the specified * address intersects with any code region or not. */ void pmap_cs_lookup( pmap_t pmap, vm_map_address_t vaddr, pmap_cs_lookup_results_t *results); /** * Let the PPL know that the associated pmap needs to be debugged and therefore it needs * to allow invalid code to be mapped in. PPL shall only allow this when the pmap posseses * the appropriate debuggee entitlement. */ kern_return_t pmap_cs_allow_invalid(pmap_t pmap); /** * Acquire the trust level which is put onto a pmap based on the code signature associated * with the main region. This function does NOT take a lock on the pmap and does not trap * into the PPL. */ kern_return_t pmap_get_trust_level_kdp( pmap_t pmap, pmap_cs_trust_t *trust_level); /** * Acquire the start and end address for the JIT region for the pmap, if any. * This function does NOT take a lock on the pmap and does not trap into the PPL. */ kern_return_t pmap_get_jit_address_range_kdp( pmap_t pmap, uintptr_t *jit_region_start, uintptr_t *jit_region_end); /** * Copy over the main binary association from the old address space to the new address * space. This is required since a fork copies over all associations from one address space * to another, and we need to make sure the main binary association is made before any * libraries are mapped in. */ kern_return_t pmap_cs_fork_prepare( pmap_t old_pmap, pmap_t new_pmap); /** * Keep a reference to the kernel entitlements data structure within the cd_entry in * order to establish a read-only chain for the kernel to query in order to resolve the * entitlements on an address space. */ kern_return_t pmap_associate_kernel_entitlements( pmap_cs_code_directory_t *cd_entry, const void *kernel_entitlements); /** * Resolve the kernel entitlements object attached to the main binary of an address space * and return it back to the kernel. */ kern_return_t pmap_resolve_kernel_entitlements( pmap_t pmap, const void **kernel_entitlements); /** * Accelerate the CoreEntitlements context for a particular cd_entry. This operation can * only be performed on reconstituted code signatures, and accelerates the context using * memory which is locked by the PPL. * * If the code signature pages have enough space left within them, then that extra space * is used for allocating the acceleration buffer, otherwise we tap into the allocator * for it. */ kern_return_t pmap_accelerate_entitlements( pmap_cs_code_directory_t *cd_entry); #endif /* PMAP_CS_INCLUDE_CODE_SIGNING */ /** * The PPl allocates some space for AppleImage4 to store some of its data. It needs to * allocate this space since this region needs to be PPL protected, and the macro which * makes a region PPL protected isn't available to kernel extensions. * * This function can be used to acquire the memory region which is PPL protected. */ void* pmap_image4_pmap_data( size_t *allocated_size); /** * Use the AppleImage4 API to set a nonce value based on a particular nonce index. * AppleImage4 ensures that a particular nonce domain value can only be set once * during the boot of the system. */ void pmap_image4_set_nonce( const img4_nonce_domain_index_t ndi, const img4_nonce_t *nonce); /** * Use the AppleImage4 API to roll the nonce associated with a particular domain to * make the nonce invalid. */ void pmap_image4_roll_nonce( const img4_nonce_domain_index_t ndi); /** * Use the AppleImage4 API to copy the nonce value associated with a particular domain. * * The PPL will attempt to "pin" the nonce_out parameter before writing to it. */ errno_t pmap_image4_copy_nonce( const img4_nonce_domain_index_t ndi, img4_nonce_t *nonce_out); /** * Use the AppleImage4 API to perform object execution of a particular known object type. * * These are the supported object types: * - IMG4_RUNTIME_OBJECT_SPEC_INDEX_SUPPLEMENTAL_ROOT */ errno_t pmap_image4_execute_object( img4_runtime_object_spec_index_t obj_spec_index, const img4_buff_t *payload, const img4_buff_t *manifest); /** * Use the AppleImage4 API to copy an executed objects contents into provided memroy. * * The PPL will attempt to "pin" the object_out parameter before writing to it. */ errno_t pmap_image4_copy_object( img4_runtime_object_spec_index_t obj_spec_index, vm_address_t object_out, size_t *object_length); /** * Entry point for the new AppleImage4 to enter the PPL monitor for it's variety of * tasks. */ errno_t pmap_image4_monitor_trap( image4_cs_trap_t selector, const void *input_data, size_t input_size); #endif /* XNU_KERNEL_PRIVATE */ __END_DECLS #endif /* KERNEL_PRIVATE */ #endif /* _VM_PMAP_CS_H_ */ |